under / standings

Dan Chalykoff

danchalykoff@hotmail.com

Stoic Values IX

Stoic ethics still has more to offer, though not always agreeably.  The next premise that has me asking questions is quoted below:

While it is plausible that accepting one virtue logically necessitates accepting all others, credibility is strained to breaking in the face of human behaviour.  I have been alive well over half a century and have yet to meet a single individual whose actions are dictated solely by logic and in perfect, or even good, consistently virtuous lines.  My sense of a life of excellence is one in which we work diligently to maintain our ideals and to keep them before us, though we consistently stumble over the subtleties of day-to-day reality, and our own errors of judgment.

Further, to accept that a virtuous person is similarly disposed to each individual virtue is to ignore one’s knowledge of the uniqueness of human character.  To our cores, we are hierarchically attuned creatures which means simply that we like one thing more than another and although that one thing may change month-to-month, our preferential nature does not.

Now, if the Stoics meant by “…a certain way…” that we have a hierarchy of virtues, there is less to disagree with.  But, to read the quote carefully, “They held that the same virtuous mind is wise, just, courageous, and moderate” (these four primary virtues were examined last week, here).  Maybe I can order that mind on Amazon?    I hope so because half a dozen universities, hundreds of well-studied books, and enormous admiration for virtue still finds me stumbling regularly. 

Their last point is that within one individual you can find a poet, and orator, and a general.  While this is surely true, what are the chances that that person is equally capable in all three domains?  Zilch, based on my experience.  Chances are high that that person is first a general, second an orator, and third a poet both in ability, accomplishment, and talent levels.  Simply to fit into a (relatively) free market, one skillset almost always dominates.  As such, the analogy is easily understood but unconvincing if emphasising equal capability in all realms of endeavour.

Moreover, this entire argument is more ontology (the nature of being) than ethics for it makes claims about the fundamental playing out of ethics in a human life rather than offering guidance for humans in search of an ethical system.  In short, unhelpful, as currently understood.

The next point for exploration is appropriate acts or proper functions.  Health is given as an example of an indifferent i.e., by Stoic reasoning “…health is neither good nor bad in itself, but rather is capable of being used well or badly…”  To be charitable, the Stoics meant that because our health is ultimately out of our own hands, it is not within our control and therefore a preferred indifferent.  To the extent that we understand that health can fail at any time, this is useful because it helps people to set priorities and to mentally prepare for the time when one’s health fails, as it does for all living creatures.

That stated, it is wildly counter-intuitive to buy the assumption that health is not good in itself.  In fact, it is bloody glorious and worth high maintenance and regular celebration as in the toast among friends, good health, or Santé, or À votre santé.  Contained in that toast is the explicit hope that good health comes to those present and remains.  As understood, the Stoics failed to classify health as a primary virtue because, despite one’s best efforts, health can fail.  The real primary virtues, by Stoic standards, were moderation, wisdom, and courage in the face of that failing health.  Those virtues are primary because they are fully within the control of a human being, while health is not. 

There is a sort of metaphysical fairness or equity in this position.  For example, if we treat health as a primary virtue, a person who has become diseased is then less virtuous.  Hardly just.  And for that reason, the Stoic ethics do seem to work as the real virtue is in handling that disease with aplomb and equanimity.  So, what about addiction?

By my lights, addiction is not a disease, but a behavioural disorder based on one’s psycho-social history.  Let’s rank disorders as lesser diseases but without the medical etiology and fatalism.  So, if one becomes addicted to a substance or behaviour, one has failed in their treatment of that preferred indifferent, health.  However, knowing what I do about the causes of addiction (poor attachment, dysfunctional families, trauma…) this is an existential failure, in that the failure of perfect health occurred, but is it also an ethical failure?  Ought we castigate or judge children who had dysfunctional parents, families, or trauma?  No, in an evidence-based reality, we account for (logos) these factors when assessing that person’s life story.

If we go to a favoured definition of addiction there are three requirements: 1) a susceptible organism, 2) an addictive behaviour or substance, and 3) stress (Maté, 2018, p. 139).  Is it a bad choice to deal with stress through an addictive behaviour or substance?  Yes, it is, existentially, but perhaps not ethically.  In fact, if life itself is one of the ultimate preferred indifferents, it is arguable that addiction is what displaces pain long enough to provide some sort of relief from unremitting failure, doom, or psycho-social disorder.  Many people find their way out of addiction (Shinebourne & Smith, 2011; Granfield & Cloud, 1996), but there are some interesting conditions that go along with that (more next week).

To cut to the chase, it is the reversal of addictive behaviours, the entering of sobriety and movement into recovery that constitutes the Stoic virtue.  As with most ethical systems, it is the agential action that differentiates the good from the bad.  What that means is that we have a choice.  Every day in every situation.  One day, the better choice is trying not to use.  More on this next week when Aristotle trumps the Stoics.

Dan Chalykoff is a Registered Psychotherapist (Qualifying).  He works at CMHA-Hamilton and Healing Pathways Counselling, Oakville, where his focus is clients with addiction, trauma, burnout, and major life changes.  He writes these blogs to increase (and share) his own evolving understanding of ideas.  Since 2017, he has facilitated two voluntary weekly group meetings of SMART Recovery.  Please email him (danchalykoff@hotmail.com) to be added to or removed from the Bcc’d emailing list.

References

Granfield, R., & Cloud, W. (1996). The elephant that no one sees: Natural recovery among middle-class addicts. Journal of Drug Issues, 26(1), 45–61. https://doi.org/10.1177/002204269602600104

Maté, G. (2018). In the realm of hungry ghosts: close encounters with addiction. Vintage Canada.

Shinebourne, P., Smith, J.A. (2011). ‘It is just habitual’: an interpretive phenomenological analysis of the experience of long-term recovery from addiction.  Mental Health Addiction (2011) 9:282-295.

Stephens, W. O. (2023, September 1). Stoic Ethics.  Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophyhttps://iep.utm.edu/stoiceth/#:~:text=All%20other%20things%20were%20judged,be%20used%20well%20and%20badly.

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